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The Phantom Vanish Magic Trick:
Investigating the Disappearance of a
Non-existent Object in a Dynamic
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1 Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK, 2 Crossmodal Research Laboratory, Oxford, UK,
3 The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia
Drawing inspiration from sleight-of-hand magic tricks, we developed an experimental
paradigm to investigate whether magicians’ misdirection techniques could be used
to induce the misperception of “phantom” objects. While previous experiments
investigating sleight-of-hand magic tricks have focused on creating false assumptions
about the movement of an object in a scene, our experiment investigated creating
false assumptions about the presence of an object in a scene. Participants watched a
sequence of silent videos depicting a magician performing with a single object. Following
each video, participants were asked to write a description of the events in the video. In
the final video, participants watched the Phantom Vanish Magic Trick, a novel magic
trick developed for this experiment, in which the magician pantomimed the actions of
presenting an object and then making it magically disappear. No object was presented
during the final video. The silent videos precluded the use of false verbal suggestions,
and participants were not asked leading questions about the objects. Nevertheless,
32% of participants reported having visual impressions of non-existent objects. These
findings support an inferential model of perception, wherein top-down expectations
can be manipulated by the magician to generate vivid illusory experiences, even in the
absence of corresponding bottom-up information.
Keywords: misdirection, illusion, amodal completion, modal completion, pantomime, ecological perception,
inferential perception, expectation
INTRODUCTION
The performance of magic is based on practical and theoretical knowledge of psychology
(see Gregory, 1982; Kuhn et al., 2008; Macknik et al., 2008; Rensink and Kuhn, 2015).
Performance magic, particularly sleight-of-hand or “conjuring,” represents a rich resource
for experimental psychologists. In particular, sleight-of-hand magic tricks provide a unique
opportunity to investigate illusory perceptions of complex dynamic scenes. Magicians have spent
millennia informally experimenting with perception, attention, and memory (e.g., Christopher and
Christopher, 1973; Thomas et al., 2015), and theoretical writings on magic, dating back hundreds
of years (e.g., Scot, 1584; Hodgson and Davey, 1887), anticipated recent scientific accounts of
psychological phenomena.
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Empirical investigations of magic played a critical role in
the establishment of Experimental Psychology as a scientific
discipline (e.g., Wundt, 1879; see Figure 1), and early
psychologists have written about the psychology of magic
tricks (Jastrow, 1888, 1896; Dessoir, 1893; Binet, 1896; Triplett,
1900; see also Lamont, 2010; Thomas et al., 2016). However,
performance magic was largely ignored by the scientific
community throughout the twentieth century (Hyman, 1989).
The first scientific study of magic to implement physiological
measurements of adults perceiving magic effects was not
conducted until 2005. Kuhn and Tatler (2005) used an eye-
tracking paradigm to examine participants who watched a
simple magic trick involving the apparent disappearance of a
cigarette and a lighter. By integrating eye-tracking with sleight-
of-hand-based stimuli, this experiment arguably marks one of
the first scientific examinations of magic to move beyond the
domain of observations, reviews, and opinion pieces into formal
empirical investigation. This trend towards a “science of magic”
has continued throughout the past decade, with researchers
adapting magic tricks to investigate a wide variety of cognitive
mechanisms. The present study builds upon previous research
by introducing a novel paradigm designed to test how magicians
can manipulate the way spectators perceive objects in dynamic
scenes. While previous studies (e.g., Kuhn and Land, 2006; Beth
and Ekroll, 2015) have demonstrated that magic tricks can cause
spectators to make false assumptions about the movement of
objects in a scene, the current study takes this a step further by
testing whether misdirection can cause spectators to make false
assumptions about the presence of objects in a scene.
Magicians have written extensively about the theory and
practice of magic (e.g., Houdin, 1868/1881; Maskelyne and
Devant, 1911), and it is useful to adopt some of their informal
terminology when describing empirical investigations involving
magic (e.g., Lamont and Wiseman, 1999). In this terminology, a
“trick” consists of both an “effect” and a “method,” effect referring
to the subjective experience of the spectators, and method
referring to the mechanisms by which the effect is achieved
(see Lamont, 2015; Rensink and Kuhn, 2015 for a discussion of
classifying magic tricks based on methods and effects). For a trick
to be successful, the performer must disguise the true method
behind the effect, creating an “illusion of impossibility” (e.g.,
Nelms, 1969; Ortiz, 2006); the manipulations used to accomplish
this are referred to as “misdirection.”
Misdirection is a particularly elusive term (e.g., Lamont and
Wiseman, 1999; Kuhn et al., 2014). To date, most psychological
considerations of misdirection have focused almost exclusively
on how misdirection can be used to conceal objects and events
from spectators (e.g., Lamont and Wiseman, 1999; Kuhn and
Findlay, 2010; Memmert, 2010). Existing paradigms tend to focus
on how to prevent spectators from detecting ostensibly visible
elements of the methods behind magic effects. These failures to
see have been associated with phenomena such as inattentional
blindness (Kuhn and Tatler, 2005; Barnhart and Goldinger, 2014)
and change blindness (e.g., Johansson et al., 2005; Smith et al.,
2012, 2013). But misdirection does not only involve inducing
failures to see, it can also involve inducing misperceptions of
illusory objects. The one notable exception to this trend of
FIGURE 1 | Impossible knots in an endless cord (Zöllner, 1878). Using
this experiment, Professor Johann Zöllner described how a professional spirit
medium could cause knots to form in a length of rope, even though the ends
of the rope were sealed. Zöllner asserted that this was evidence of a
supernatural power unexplained by modern science. Wundt (1879) argued
that it was trickery. While Wundt was in the process of establishing the first
Experimental Psychology Laboratory at the University of Liepzig, he became
embroiled in a debate about the scientific value of investigating alleged
supernatural phenomenon. His colleagues, including Johann Zöllner, Gustav
Fechner and Ernst Weber, believed that they had discovered a new branch of
“transcendental” physics, while Wundt maintained that they had been
deceived by magic tricks or “jugglery.” This controversy gave rise to a series of
articles by early experimental psychologists looking to investigate the
relationship between illusory perception and beliefs (Jastrow, 1888, 1896;
Dessoir, 1893; Binet, 1896; Triplett, 1900).
focusing on concealment is the empirical investigation of the
Vanishing Ball Illusion. This effect was first introduced into the
psychological literature by Dessoir (1893), an early psychologist
and amateur magician (Whaley, 2006). Dessoir described how a
magician might induce the misperception of an illusory object –
by tossing an orange into the air two times, then secretly dropping
the orange into his pocket while pantomiming a third toss with
his empty hand. Spectators would misperceive the orange leaving
the magician’s hand and disappearing into the air on the third
toss.
Triplett (1900) conducted actual informal experiments with
schoolchildren, in which he performed a similar trick using
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a tennis ball. About half the children reported that they had
perceived the ball rise towards the ceiling and then vanish. This
Vanishing Ball Illusion has been adapted by Kuhn and Land
(2006), who demonstrated that 63% of adult observers reported
an illusory ball. They also argued that eye-tracking recordings
suggested that social cues from the magician contributed to
the illusion, that is, spectators who experienced the Vanishing
Ball Illusion (the misperception of an illusory ball) looked to
the magician’s eyes and were misdirected by his gaze as he
looked upwards during the false throw. Subsequent studies have
demonstrated that this magical effect remains relatively robust
even without deceptive social cues (Thomas and Didierjean,
2016a; for a broader discussion of the role of social cues in magic
see Cui et al., 2011; Tachibana and Kawabata, 2014; Kuhn et al.,
2016). More recent research has demonstrated that the illusion
can also be induced even in the absence of the initial “real” throws
(Kuhn and Rensink, 2016).
Other studies involving sleight-of-hand magic tricks have used
the false transfer method to examine the degree of “magicalness”
of performances. Beth and Ekroll (2015) showed participants
a series of videos of a magician performing magic tricks that
included several “vanishes.” The effect was that a poker chip
seemed to disappear inexplicably, and this was accomplished with
a method known as a false transfer – the magician pretended
to pass a poker chip from one hand to his other, while secretly
retaining it in his first hand. By manipulating the timing between
the moment of the false transfer and the revelation that the
poker chip was not in the magician’s hand, they found that
participants would rate the quicker revelations of the empty hand
as being relatively more magical. The authors suggested that
such vanishing effects could be linked with the ideas of modal
and amodal completion – perceptual experiences that are not
directly drawn from any sensory modality (see also Nanay, 2009;
Barnhart, 2010; Ekroll et al., 2013).
While many studies of sleight-of-hand magic tricks have
focused on the role of spectators’ perceptions, an additional small
body of literature focuses specifically on the physical actions of
the magician’s hands. For example, one study (Cavina-Pratesi
et al., 2011) has demonstrated that practicing magicians are
significantly more skillful at pantomiming actions compared to
control participants (non-magicians). When asked to pantomime
the action of picking up an object, control participants made
hand motions that were notably different from genuine grasping
gestures. In contrast, the fake grasping gestures of the magicians
were more kinematically similar to their genuine grasping
actions. Such expertise contributes to the deceptiveness of sleight-
of-hand performances (Phillips et al., 2015), and surveys of
professional magicians indicate that they place a particularly high
value on pantomimic expertise (e.g., Rissanen et al., 2014).
The present study extends previous research on the false
transfer method and the Vanishing Ball Illusion by introducing
a novel magic trick, adapted by the first author. The Phantom
Vanish Trick was created to investigate the idea that participants
can form vivid illusory impressions of objects in response to
magic performances. The method is inspired by a sleight-
of-hand technique historically referred to as a “bluff vanish”
(e.g., Shephard, 1946; Bobo, 1952). In the original method, the
magician begins by clearly and openly showing the spectators
that he is holding a handful of mixed coins. Then, with his other
empty hand, he reaches into the handful of coins and pantomimes
the action of taking away a single coin. The magician does not
actually take anything from the handful of coins, but he does
(falsely) verbally indicate to the spectators that he has taken one
of the coins. Next, the magician disposes of the “remaining”
coins into his pocket (really all of the coins go into the pocket,
since he did not actually take any coin away from the original
handful). Finally, the magician goes through the pantomime
of making the single coin disappear. This trick is effectively a
false transfer that depends both on the convincingness of the
pantomime and also on the spectator not being able to count the
original handful of coins. The Phantom Vanish Trick streamlines
this idea by eliminating the handful of coins altogether. The
magician simply pantomimes the actions of presenting an object
and making it disappear. A real object is never presented at any
point during the trick. Additionally, in the current experiment,
the Phantom Vanish Trick was presented in the context of a silent
video, meaning that the magician was not able to use false verbal
information to mislead the spectators.
The Phantom Vanish Trick represents a novel contribution
to the perception literature in that it has the potential to
demonstrate that a spectator’s top-down expectations can lead
them to perceive illusory objects where none have been presented.
This is an extension of previous experiments that have shown
that people may falsely infer the illusory motion of an object.
For example, in the Vanishing Ball Illusion, spectators reported
seeing an illusory ball leave the magician’s hand. Similarly, Cui
et al. (2011) reported that participants falsely perceived a coin
being tossed by a magician from one hand to the other, despite
the fact that the coin was actually retained in the initial hand that
was making the toss.
Proponents of ecological theories of perception have made
strong predictions about the potential for healthy adults to
misperceive objects. Gibson (1982) asserted that it is impossible
to induce the false visual perception of an object where none
exists (barring optical illusions or pharmacological or psychiatric
considerations). He states:
“Do we ever really “see” a non-existent object or place as if it
existed? I do not mean the virtual object in a mirror, or a pictured
object behind the picture, or a mirage in the desert air, but a
hallucinated object, a thing for which no invariants are present in
the ambient light even when the presumably drugged or diseased
observer walks around it. If it is true that the absence of all
structure in the light specifies air, i.e., “nothing” in the sense of
no thing, the answer must be that we do not and cannot (p. 223,
original emphasis).”
While ecological theorists assert that human phenomeno-
logical experience is derived directly from bottom-up sensory
information, inferential theorists (e.g., Helmholtz, 1867; Gregory,
1997, 2009) propose that phenomenological experiences are
derived from top-down interpretations of bottom-up sensory
information. Thus, if participants do report the presence of
objects after viewing the Phantom Vanish Trick, this would
support an inferential theory of human visual perception. Such
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reports would imply that top-down information, in this case,
the strong expectation that the object is present, is subjectively
indistinguishable from veridical sensory information. In other
words, participants will have the experience of seeing an object
even though it is not presented because they think that it ought
to be there.
Based on informal observations of professional magic trick
performances, as well as previous studies of sleight-of-hand
magic tricks and pantomimes (e.g., Kuhn and Land, 2006; Phillips
et al., 2015), we predicted that some participants who watched the
video of the Phantom Vanish Trick would report the presence of a
non-existent object, and that there were three possible outcomes.
Of the participants who did experience the Phantom Vanish
Illusion (PVI), some would indicate that they saw the magician
make “something” disappear while others would indicate that
they saw the magician make a specific object disappear (e.g., a
“silver coin” or “red ball”). The third possible outcome was that
some participants would fail to experience the PVI, and they
would simply provide a veridical report of the events shown in
the video.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants were recruited to take part in the study online (see
Woods et al., 2015 for a review of online behavioral research
methods) through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.1 There were 420
participants who completed the study (mean age = 33.5 years;
age range = 19–73 years; male = 237), and an additional 23
participants who were excluded from the analysis because they
did not complete the experiment. All participants self-reported
as having normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of
neurological illness or injury. Participants were tested following a
protocol approved by the University of Oxford Research Ethics
Committee, and in accordance with the ethical standards laid
down in the 2008 Declaration of Helsinki. Each participant
1A consideration here is that data collection was done online as opposed to in
a more traditional laboratory setting. A popular argument for not conducting
research online is that the data collected is for some reason unreliable; for example,
because it is unknown if participants are properly paying attention. One way of
assessing this is to ask participants a “catch” question at the end of the study
(e.g., “do not click continue, rather click the small circle at the bottom of the
screen”; Oppenheimer et al., 2009). Hauser and Schwarz (2016) tested this issue
and found that, while Mechanical Turk participants failed such a task 5% of the
time, a staggering 61% of laboratory-based participants also failed the task. We
did not include such a catch question for this reason. In terms of the overall
data reliability issue, almost all attempts of replicating laboratory-based psychology
studies online have been successful (e.g., Germine et al., 2012; Crump et al., 2013;
Klein et al., 2014), with the few exceptions being attributable to inconsistencies
in the hardware used by the participants. Hardware discrepancies can make it
difficult to present very short duration stimuli onscreen accurately, such as is
important in the masked-priming study, which failed to be completely replicated
(Crump et al., 2013). Our stimuli were videos, all of which were over 10 seconds
long, and so would not thus be affected. Of course, we also benefited from our
online participants being less WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich,
and Democratic; Henrich et al., 2010; Berinsky et al., 2012) than laboratory-
based participants. (Although some would argue that online participants are weird
in their own right, for example, by being much more computer literate than
individuals recruited off the street; for a discussion on this and a more in depth
overview of the above issues, the reader is directed to Woods et al., 2015.)
completed the experiment individually online and was given US
$1.50 as compensation for their time.
Stimuli and Procedure
The study was conducted online using Adobe Flash-based
Xperiment software.2 Participants completed the experiment
using their own computers, and at the start of the study,
participants had the option of viewing the stimuli in a discrete
browser window or in “full-screen” mode.
Stimuli consisted of a total of 22 videos. All videos were
recorded in 1080 HD, at 30 FPS, using an iPhone 5S, and
edited for length in iMovie. All of the videos were silent,
to control for the fact that participants would be watching
on their personal devices with varying audio capabilities. The
stimuli set included one “practice” video, and one “critical”
video – the Phantom Vanish Trick. There was only one version
of each of these two videos, and they were shown to every
participant. The other 20 videos included 15 “magic trick”
videos and five “non-magic control” videos. There were three
types of magic trick videos: Video 1, Miscellaneous Trick;
Video 2, Vanish Trick; Video 4, Appearance Trick, and one
type of control video: Video 3, Non-Magic Control. There
were 20 videos because each of these four types of videos
(Miscellaneous, Vanish, Appearance, and Non-Magic Control)
was performed with five different objects: Condition 1, Silver
Coin; Condition 2, Red Ball; Condition 3, Poker Chip; Condition
4, Silk Handkerchief; Condition 5, Crayon. See Table 1 for the
number of participants in each of the five object conditions,
and Figure 2 for an illustration of the five different object
conditions.
Participants watched a five-video sequence that was presented
in an order designed to approximate a routine that might be
performed within the context of a magic show. See Figure 3 for
a breakdown of the five-video sequences that were possible with
each of the five different object conditions. In all of the videos,
a brass cup was visible on the table to the left of the magician.
The cup was a receptacle for the objects. The first four videos in
the sequence (which always showed an object) were intended to
establish an expectation that the magician would take an object
out of the cup, while the fifth video (which did not show an
object) served as the critical video. See Figure 4 for an illustration
of a five-video sequence. The complete set of videos can be viewed
online3.
2www.xperiment.mobi
3https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLnfidBe0mwswzhAjRLRLMDrEO0z
GJYi23
TABLE 1 | Number of participants in each of five different object
conditions.
Condition Object Participants
1 Silver coin 81
2 Red ball 80
3 Poker chip 100
4 Silk handkerchief 79
5 Crayon 80
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FIGURE 2 | Five different object conditions were used in the experiment. In the first four videos of the five-video sequence, participants only ever saw one of
the five objects – silver coin, red ball, poker chip, silk handkerchief, or crayon. In Video 5 there was no object presented.
FIGURE 3 | Participants were presented with a five-video sequence –
Video 1: Miscellaneous Trick; Video 2: Vanish Trick; Video 3:
Non-Magic Control; Video 4: Appearance Trick; Video 5: Phantom
Vanish Trick. The first four videos depicted a magician performing with a
single object – either a silver coin (Condition 1), a red ball (Condition 2), a
poker chip (Condition 3), a silk handkerchief (Condition 4), or a crayon
(Condition 5). The object varied for participants, so that one group of
participants watched a five-video sequence involving a silver coin (Condition
1) while another watched a five-video sequence involving a red ball (Condition
2), etc. The order of the tricks in the five videos that constituted a video
sequence was intended to approximate a routine from a magic show.
Videos 1, 2, and 4 were presented as magic tricks. They were
designed to establish that the magician was performing magical
actions with the object. The tricks were presented so that the
methods could not be easily inferred from the video, assuming
that the participant did not have prior knowledge of the methods
behind magic tricks. Video 1, the Miscellaneous Trick, showed
the magician doing something magical with the object (e.g.,
breaking it and magically restoring it, or magically changing its
color). Video 2, the Vanish Trick, showed the magician making
the object seemingly disappear. Video 4, the Appearance Trick,
showed the magician apparently producing the object from
thin air.
Video 3, the Non-Magic Control, served as a manipulation
check for demand characteristics. Participants had been informed
that they would be watching a series of magic tricks, which
might have led them to describe magic tricks even when the
video did not depict a magic trick. Video 3 did not depict any
apparent magical or impossible events (e.g., Video 3, Object
Condition 1 depicted the magician placing the silver coin
between his teeth). Therefore, if participants did report seeing
magical or impossible events after watching this video, we would
be unable to rule-out the influence of demand characteristics
on participants’ responses to Video 5, the Phantom Vanish
Trick.
Video 5, the Phantom Vanish Trick, served as the critical video
of the experiment. Participants’ responses to this video directly
addressed our central question: Could a silent pantomime of
a magic trick result in reports of objects where none were
presented? This video showed the magician pantomiming the
action of removing an object from the cup and then going
through the motions of making the non-existent object disappear.
Unlike the first four videos, no object was shown in the Phantom
Vanish Trick.
Participants were asked to write a description of each video
(Question 1) and to provide three ratings of how surprising
(Question 2), how impossible (Question 3), and how magical
(Question 4) they found the video. At the end of the experiment,
after watching all of the videos, participants were asked to
report how interesting they generally considered magic tricks
to be (Question 5). See Table 2, the Spectators’ Experience
Questionnaire, for the complete list of questions. The ratings for
Questions 2–4 were collected using a series of visual analog scales.
Participants were presented with a continuous line anchored at
one end with the words “not at all surprising” (or impossible
or magical) and at the other end with “very surprising” (or
impossible or magical). For each rating (of surprising, impossible
or magical), participants were instructed: “Please use your mouse
to indicate your response on the slider below” (see Reips and
Funke, 2008 for a discussion of using computer-based visual
analog scales).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 July 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 950
fpsyg-07-00950 July 19, 2016 Time: 15:10 # 6
Tompkins et al. The Phantom Vanish Magic Trick
FIGURE 4 | An illustration of a five-video sequence, as viewed by a participant. All participants in Object Condition 1, Silver Coin, watched Videos 1–4
(Miscellaneous Trick, Vanish Trick, Non-Magic Control, Appearance Trick) that depicted a magician performing with a silver coin before they watched Video 5
(Phantom Vanish Trick), which did not include an object. Note that participants in Object Conditions 2–5 also watched similar five-video sequences involving different
objects. Regardless of which object condition the participants were in for Videos 1–4, the Phantom Vanish Trick (Video 5) was identical for every participant.
The critical question was Question 1 for Video 5
(Phantom Vanish Trick). The participants’ responses to
this question allowed us to determine whether they had
experienced the PVI. The ratings for Questions 2–4 for
Video 5 were intended to corroborate the written reports
(i.e., participants who experienced the PVI should consider
Video 5 to be more magical and/or impossible than those
who did not experience the illusion). Throughout the
experiment, the questions served to keep the participants
actively engaged with the videos, and by asking the same
questions about every video in the sequence, we avoided
placing any special emphasis on Video 5 (Phantom Vanish
Trick) that might have otherwise influenced the participants’
responses.
In summary, the experiment began with the participants
being informed, through onscreen written instructions, that they
would be watching a series of short (less than 30 s) videos.
They were told that they would be able to control when the
videos started and that, during the experiment, each video could
only be played once. Participants then completed the practice
trial, and they were given the option to repeat the practice
trial or to begin the experiment. The practice trial included
a video, depicting the magician magically transforming one
playing card into another, followed by Questions 1–4. Once
participants confirmed that they wished to begin the trial, they
were presented with a written cue: “Press SPACE to start the
trial.” Pressing the spacebar initiated the trial. The practice
trial was in an identical format to the experimental trials; that
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TABLE 2 | Spectators’ experience questionnaire.
Response format Question
Q1 Written Verbal Response Please write a description of what was shown in the video. Do your best to describe
specific actions and events in the order that they occurred.
Q2 Visual Analog Scale (from “not at all surprising” to “very
surprising”)
How surprising did you find the events shown in this video?
Q3 Visual Analog Scale (from “not at all impossible” to “very
impossible”)
To what degree did the events shown in this video seem to be physically impossible?
Q4 Visual Analog Scale (from “not at all magical” to “very
magical”)
How magical did you find the events shown in this video?
Q5∗ Visual Analog Scale (from “not at all interesting” to “very
interesting”)
In general, how interesting do you consider magic tricks to be?
∗Participants answered Q1–Q4 a total of five times, that is, once after each video in the five-video sequence, but they answered Q5 only once at the end of the experiment.
is, after each video ended, participants were presented with
Questions 1–4 of the Spectators’ Experience Questionnaire (see
Table 2). For each experimental trial, participants were required
to answer each question (by typing text for Question 1 and
by clicking on the visual analog scale slider for Questions 2–
4) before they watched the next video in the sequence. This
process was repeated until participants had watched all five
videos in the five-video sequence and responded to the four
questions following each video. The five five-video sequences
differed by the object that was used in Videos 1–4, but Video
5, the Phantom Vanish Trick, was the same for all participants
regardless of which object condition they participated in. Finally,
every participant answered one additional question (Question
5 of the Spectators’ Experience Questionnaire): “In general,
how interesting do you consider magic tricks to be? Please use
your mouse to indicate your response on the slider below.”
Participants indicated their responses by clicking with their
mouse at a point along a continuous line anchored at one end
with the words “not at all interesting” and at the other end with
“very interesting.”
RESULTS
Participants’ Written Reports for
Question 1 on the Spectators’
Experience Questionnaire
Question 1 (Q1) of the Spectators’ Experience Questionnaire
was presented immediately after each individual video of the
five-video sequence, and the participants were asked:
“Please write a description of what was shown in the video. Do your
best to describe specific actions and events in the order that they
occurred.”
Participants’ Written Reports for the Magic Tricks
(Videos 1, 2, and 4)
Videos 1, 2, and 4 were designed to be perceived as conventional
magic tricks; each video depicted a trick that involved a single
effect intended to create an apparent illusion of impossibility.
As predicted, participants reported that they found the videos to
be both impossible and magical. Overall, the videos were 97.3%
effective in successfully conveying the intended magic tricks,
and importantly, no participant reported the presence of a non-
existent object in Videos 1, 2, or 4. All 420 participants generated
one written report for each of the four videos they viewed, for
a total 1260 separate verbal reports. Only 34 reports, from 27
separate participants, indicated that the trick was perceived as
non-magical:
• Twenty-one reports related to Video 1, the Miscellaneous
Trick – four participants reported the correct method behind
the Karate Coin Trick, 1 participant reported the correct
method behind the Color Changing Silk Trick, and 16
participants erroneously stated that they saw the magician
“throw” the chip upwards during the Levitating Poker Chip
video (although this was not the genuine method, the trick was
nevertheless perceived as non-magical);
• Nine reports related to Video 2, the Vanish Trick – seven
participants reported the correct method behind the Chip
Vanish Trick, one participant reported the correct method
behind the Silk Vanish Trick, and one participant reported the
correct method behind the Crayon Vanish Trick;
• Four reports related to Video 4, the Appearance Trick – four
participants reported the correct method behind the Crayon
Production.
Participants’ Written Reports for the Non-Magic
Control (Video 3)
Video 3, the Non-Magic Control video, was not a conventional
magic trick in that it was not designed to create an illusion of
impossibility; instead, the magician performed an action that was
intended to appear surprising but not to violate any natural or
physical laws. As predicted, none of the participants reported
seeing anything impossible or magical in the Non-Magic Control
video, and importantly, no participant reported the presence of
a non-existent object in Video 3. Some examples of the reports
include: “He took a coin out of the cup and put it between his
teeth” or “The man took the coin out of the cup and put it into
his mouth. Then he waved his hands to the side, and rested
his arms on the table afterward. Nothing magical happened.”
The responses provided by the participants indicated that they
were distinguishing between the magic trick videos (Videos
1, 2, and 4) and the Non-Magic Control (Video 3) because,
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unlike the reports for the magic trick videos, the participants
did not report anything impossible or magical in response to
Video 3.
Participants’ Written Reports for the Phantom Vanish
Trick (Video 5)
Video 5, the Phantom Vanish Trick, was the critical video
of the experiment. In contrast to the first four videos, no
object was visible in this video; the Phantom Vanish Trick was
intended to induce the illusory perception of a “phantom” object
where no object was presented. Reports of phantom objects
were categorized based on the participants’ written reports for
Q1:
(1) Participants who only described the veridical events of the
video were categorized as not having reported experiencing
the PVI (e.g., “The magician pretended to take something out
of the cup and make it disappear” or “His hands were empty.
He reached into the cup. He then waved his hands around
and then his hands remained empty”);
(2) Participants who reported that the magician took
“something” out of the cup but did not provide any
details about the object, were categorized as having reported
experiencing the PVI but not reporting a specific object (e.g.,
“He took something out of the cup and it disappeared” or
“The man takes the object from the cup into his hand. He
makes a hand motion and it disappears. He points to his
hand to show that it is indeed empty”);
(3) Participants who reported that the magician was performing
with a specific object were categorized as having not only
reported experiencing the PVI, but also having reported a
specific object (e.g., “The magician removed a silver coin
from the cup and placed it in his hand before making it
disappear”).
In summary, of the 420 participants who responded to
Q1 for Video 5, 284 participants (68%) were categorized
as not having reported experiencing the PVI and 136
participants (32%) as having reported experiencing the
PVI. Of the 136 participants categorized as having reported
experiencing the PVI, 91 participants (21% of the total
420 participants) did not report a specific object and 45
participants (11% of the total 420 participants) reported a
specific object. Of the 45 participants who reported specific
objects, 39 (87%) reported seeing objects that were congruent
with the objects they had been shown in the preceding
videos. There were six exceptions, and all six participants
reported seeing a coin (one participant in Object Condition
2, Red Ball; five participants in Object Condition 4, Silk
Handkerchief).
Participants’ Ratings for Surprising
(Question 2), Impossible (Question 3),
and Magical (Question 4) on the
Spectators’ Experience Questionnaire
For every written report (Q1) collected for Videos 1–5, we
also collected ratings from the participants for Surprising (Q2),
Impossible (Q3), and Magical (Q4). See Table 2 for the questions
administered to the participants. These ratings (Q2–4) were
included in the experimental design to corroborate the written
reports for Q1.
Participants’ Ratings (Surprising, Impossible, and
Magical) for the Magic Tricks (Videos 1, 2, and 4)
Compared to the Non-Magic Control (Video 3)
For Videos 1–4, the written reports (Q1) suggested that
participants considered the Non-Magic Control (Video 3) to be
less Impossible and Magical than the magic trick videos (Videos
1, 2, and 4). We used a linear mixed-effects model to compare
participants’ ratings of Surprising (Q2), Impossible (Q3), and
Magical (Q4) for the magic trick videos (Videos 1, 2, and 4)
compared to the Non-Magic Control (Video 3). To fit the linear
mixed-effects model, the error structure of the residuals need
to be normal and heteroskadastic; satisfactory normality was
achieved by applying a folded logarithmic transformation of the
form: log((x + 1)/(101 – x)) to the ratings data. We treated
pairings of videos and ratings as fixed effects, such that each
of the four videos (Videos 1, 2, 3, and 4) was paired with each
of the three ratings (Surprising, Impossible, and Magical) for
a total of 12 fixed effects. Participants were treated as random
effects. Models were fitted using the nlme package (Pinheiro
et al., 2016) in R (R Core Team, 2016). See Figure 5 for the
participants’ ratings of Surprising, Impossible, and Magical for
Videos 1–4.
Participants’ ratings for Surprising (Q2) were significantly
lower for the Non-Magic Control Video 3 (M = 23.41, 95% CI
[19.95, 27.25]) than for each of the magic trick videos: Video 1
(M = 44.54, 95% CI [39.65, 49.54], t(4609) = 8.23, P < 0.001);
Video 2 (M = 52.85, 95% CI [46.84, 56.81], t(4609) = 11.09,
P < 0.001); Video 4 (M = 55.53, 95% CI [50.53, 60.42],
t(4609)= 12.02, P < 0.001).
Participants’ ratings for Impossible (Q3) were significantly
lower for the Non-Magic Control Video 3 (M = 1.35, 95% CI
[0.94, 1.85]) than for each of the magic trick videos: Video 1
(M = 34.66, 95% CI [30.24, 39.34], t(4609) = 27.33, P < 0.001);
Video 2 (M = 49.18, 95% CI [44.18, 54.18], t(4609) = 32.48,
P < 0.001); Video 4 (M = 48.97, 95% CI [43.98, 53.98],
t(4609)= 32.41, P < 0.001).
Participants’ ratings for Magical (Q4) were significantly lower
for the Non-Magic Control Video 3 (M = 0.99, 95% CI [0.64,
1.41]) than for each of the magic trick videos: Video 1 (M= 36.80,
95% CI [32.25, 41.59], t(4609) = 29.62, P < 0.001); Video 2
(M = 54.47, 95% CI [49.46, 59.39], t(4609) = 35.79, P < 0.001);
Video 4 (M = 55.10, 95% CI [50.10, 60.00], t(4609) = 36.01,
P < 0.001).
In summary, the ratings (Q2–4) corroborated the written
reports for Q1, indicating that participants considered
the Non-Magic Control (Video 3) to be less Surprising,
Impossible, and Magical than the magic trick videos (Videos
1, 2, and 4). These findings for ratings Q2–4 further
support the earlier findings for Q1, and demonstrate that
participants were clearly distinguishing between the magic
trick videos (Videos 1, 2, and 4) and the Non-Magic Control
(Video 3).
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FIGURE 5 | Average of the participants’ ratings for Surprising, Impossible, and Magical on Videos 1–4. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Participants’ Ratings (Surprising, Impossible, and
Magical) as Predicted by Participants’ Written
Reports for the Phantom Vanish Trick (Video 5)
Participants’ written reports (Q1) for the Phantom Vanish Trick
(Video 5) suggested that there were three different ways that
participants responded to the PVI. We predicted that the
Surprising (Q2), Impossible (Q3), and Magical (Q4) ratings
from participants who were categorized as having reported
experiencing the PVI (that is, participants who reported that
they had seen an object apparently disappear during Video 5)
would be higher than the ratings from participants who were
categorized as not having reported experiencing the PVI (that
is, participants, whose experience could be described simply as
watching the magician pantomime an action without an object).
We also predicted that the ratings from participants who were
categorized as having reported experiencing the PVI and had
also reported a specific object (e.g., a silver coin) would be
higher than the ratings from participants who were categorized
as having reported experiencing the PVI but had not reported
a specific object (e.g., “the magician took something out of the
cup”).
We calculated three linear regression models to predict
ratings of Surprising, Impossible, and Magical (respectively)
from the participants’ written reports for Q1 of the Phantom
Vanish Trick. To fit the three simple linear regression models,
the error structure of the residuals need to be normal and
heteroskadastic; satisfactory normality was achieved by applying
a folded reciprocal transformation of the form: log((x+ 1)/(101 –
x)) to the ratings. For each model, our categorization of the
participants’ reported experience of the PVI in Q1 for the
Phantom Vanish Trick was used to predict the participants’
ratings of Surprising (Q2), Impossible (Q2), and Magical (Q2)
for the Phantom Vanish Trick. Models were fitted using the lm
package in R (R Core Team, 2016). See Figure 6 for participants’
ratings for Surprising, Impossible, and Magical on the Phantom
Vanish Trick (Video 5).
For each of the three models, we compared the simple
regression model to a model that included four additional
covariates. There were three categorical covariates: (1) participant
gender (male or female); (2) computer screen-view setting
(discrete or full-screen); (3) object used (i.e., Silver Coin, Red
Ball, Poker Chip, Silk Handkerchief, or Crayon); and one
continuous covariate: (4) participants’ self-reported interest in
magic tricks (this covariate was transformed in the same way
as the Surprising, Impossible, and Magical ratings, by applying
a folded reciprocal transformation). The covariates were only
included in the model reported if the likelihood test indicated
that the covariates significantly improved the fit of the model.
For example, none of the four covariates provided a significant
improvement on the simple regression model for Impossible
ratings, F(7,410) = 1.89, P = 0.07 or for Magical ratings,
F(7,410) = 1.87, P = 0.07, and therefore the simple regression
models are presented for these two ratings. In contrast, for
Surprising ratings, the likelihood test indicated that the inclusion
of two covariates – object used and participants’ self-reported
interest in magic tricks – significantly improved the fit of
the model, F(8,412) = 0.39, P < 0.01, but that the inclusion
of the two other covariates – participant gender and screen-
view setting – did not improve the model, F(2,410) = 0.39,
P = 0.68.
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FIGURE 6 | Average of the participants’ ratings for Surprising, Impossible, and Magical on the Phantom Vanish Trick (Video 5) – a comparison of
participants who did not report experiencing the Phantom Vanish Illusion (PVI) with participants who did report experiencing the PVI, and either did
or did not report a specific object. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Surprising Ratings for Video 5, the Phantom Vanish Trick
In the first of three linear regression models, we found that
participants’ reported experience of the PVI (as categorized by
their written responses to Q1 of Video 5) significantly predicted
how Surprising they found the Phantom Vanish Trick (Q2, Video
5) while controlling for object used in the four videos that
preceded the Phantom Vanish Trick (i.e., Silver Coin, Red Ball,
Poker Chip, Silk Handkerchief, or Crayon) and the participants’
self-reported interest in magic tricks, R2 = 0.11, F(7,412) = 7.59,
P < 0.001. There was a significant difference between the
Surprising ratings of participants who did not experience the
PVI (M = 5.54, 95% CI [3.18, 9.09]) and participants who
did experience the PVI but did not report a specific object
(M = 12.44, 95% CI [7.11, 20.45]), t(412) = 3.29, P < 0.01,
as well as between participants who did not experience the PVI
and participants who did experience the PVI and did report a
specific object (M = 27.24, 95% CI [15.50, 43.03]), t(412)= 5.35,
P < 0.001. In addition, for participants who did experience the
PVI, there was a significant difference in the Surprising ratings
between participants who did and did not report a specific object,
t(412) = 2.54, P = 0.02. This analysis supports our prediction
that the participants’ written reports (Q1) for the Phantom Vanish
Trick would be corroborated by their ratings of how Surprising
(Q2) they found the Phantom Vanish Trick. Participants who
we categorized (based on their written reports to Q1) as having
reported experiencing the PVI rated the Phantom Vanish Trick
as being more Surprising than those who we categorized as not
having reported experiencing the PVI. Furthermore, participants
who we categorized not only as having reported experiencing
the PVI but also as having reported a specific object, rated the
Phantom Vanish Trick as more Surprising than those who had
not reported a specific object.
Impossible Ratings for Video 5, the Phantom Vanish Trick
In the second of three linear regression models, we found that
participants’ reported experience of the PVI (as categorized by
their written responses to Q1 of Video 5) significantly predicted
how Impossible they found the Phantom Vanish Trick (Q3, Video
5), R2 = 0.31, F(2,417) = 93.24, P < 0.001. There was a significant
difference between the Impossible ratings of participants who did
not experience the PVI (M = 0.98, 95% CI [0.65, 1.36]) and
participants who did experience the PVI but did not report a
specific object (M = 8.06, 95% CI [5.73, 11.09]), t(417) = 8.45,
P< 0.001, as well as between participants who did not experience
the PVI and participants who did experience the PVI and did
report a specific object (M = 29.17, 95% CI [20.38, 39.75]),
t(417) = 12.01, P < 0.001. In addition, for participants who
did experience the PVI, there was a significant difference in the
Impossible ratings between participants who did and did not
report a specific object, t(417) = 5.10, P < 0.001. This analysis
supports our prediction that the participants’ written reports
(Q1) for the Phantom Vanish Trick would be corroborated by
their ratings of how Impossible (Q3) they found the Phantom
Vanish Trick. Participants who we categorized (based on their
written reports to Q1) as having reported experiencing the PVI
rated the Phantom Vanish Trick as being more Impossible than
those who we categorized as not having reported experiencing
the PVI. Furthermore, participants who we categorized not only
as having reported experiencing the PVI but also as having
reported a specific object, rated the Phantom Vanish Trick as
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more Impossible than those who had not reported a specific
object.
Magical Ratings for Video 5, the Phantom Vanish Trick
In the third of three linear regression models, we found that
participants’ reported experience of the PVI (as categorized by
their written responses to Q1 of Video 5) significantly predicted
how Magical they found the Phantom Vanish Trick (Q4, Video
5), R2 = 0.37, F(2,417) = 127.5, P < 0.001. There was a significant
difference between the Magical ratings of participants who did
not experience the PVI (M = 0.89, 95% CI [0.60, 1.22]) and
participants who did experience the PVI but did not report a
specific object (M = 8.91, 95% CI [6.56, 11.90]), t(417) = 10.01,
P< 0.001, as well as between participants who did not experience
the PVI and participants who did experience the PVI and did
report a specific object (M = 32.93, 95% CI [24.09, 43.11]),
t(417) = 14.07, P < 0.001. In addition, for participants who
did experience the PVI, there was a significant difference in
the Magical ratings between participants who did and did not
report a specific object, t(417) = 5.81, P < 0.001. This analysis
supports our prediction that the participants’ written reports
(Q1) for the Phantom Vanish Trick would be corroborated by
their ratings of how Magical (Q4) they found the Phantom Vanish
Trick. Participants who we categorized (based on their written
reports to Q1) as having reported experiencing the PVI rated
the Phantom Vanish Trick as being more Magical than those
who we categorized as not having reported experiencing the PVI.
Furthermore, participants who we categorized not only as having
reported experiencing the PVI but also as having reported a
specific object, rated the Phantom Vanish Trick as more Magical
than those who did not report a specific object.
DISCUSSION
Our experiment investigated the illusory presence of objects in
scenes where no object was presented. The PVI demonstrates
that spectators’ expectations, in response to magic tricks, can
lead them to imagine the existence of an object that “ought to
be there.” In some cases, this imagined representation was vivid
enough to be mistaken for a veridical visual perception. Thus,
this experiment extends previous research demonstrating that
magicians’ misdirection techniques can induce misperceptions of
visual experiences.
One-third of our participants reported having been shown an
object after watching a video where no object was presented. Our
PVI paradigm is the first investigation of sleight-of-hand magic
tricks that has involved participants spontaneously reporting
their illusory experiences. After watching each video, participants
provided written reports describing what they had been shown.
In addition to collecting written reports, we asked the participants
to rate how surprising, impossible, and magical they considered
the videos. These ratings served to corroborate the written
reports: participants who reported phantom objects rated the
Phantom Vanish Trick video to be more surprising, impossible,
and magical than those who did not experience the illusion.
Past research, on false transfer tricks (e.g., Cui et al., 2011;
Beth and Ekroll, 2015) and on the Vanishing Ball Illusion (e.g.,
Triplett, 1900; Kuhn and Land, 2006; Thomas and Didierjean,
2016a), has involved misleading participants about the motion
and location of an object: the object was shown, and then was
apparently passed from one hand to the other while secretly
being retained in the first hand; or, the object was shown and
then apparently tossed into the air while being secretly retained
in the hand (or secretly dropped into the magician’s lap). In
contrast, the PVI paradigm entirely eliminates the need to
present an object during the critical trial. Overall, our paradigm
provides strong evidence that participants who were categorized
as having experienced the illusion were honestly confusing
“phantom” objects for genuine objects. Our results also suggest
that the participants’ reports of “phantom” objects cannot be
attributed to demand characteristics. Participants’ responses to
the Spectators’ Experience Questionnaire for Video 3 (the Non-
Magic Control video) indicated that the participants were not
simply describing every video they watched as being impossible
or magical merely because they had been told that they would be
watching magic tricks. No participant reported seeing anything
impossible or magical after watching Video 3, which was rated
as significantly less impossible and less magical than the magic
trick videos (Videos 1, 2, and 4). These results also raise intriguing
questions about exactly what makes-up these “phantom” objects,
and what these reports reveal about human perception.
One might argue that the participants’ reports of illusory
objects can be attributed to memory errors rather than perceptual
errors. In other words, participants who reported seeing
the phantom objects may not have had a phenomenological
experience of “seeing” the object during the Phantom Vanish
Trick video, instead they may have retrospectively confabulated
the object after they had been cued to describe the events in the
video. The design of our experiment allows us to exclude two
memory-related factors that might otherwise have contributed
to the illusion: post-event misinformation (including verbal and
non-verbal information) and false verbal suggestions.
There is a rich literature on misinformation and the
unreliability of eye-witness testimony. Researchers have
repeatedly demonstrated that people are capable of confusing
imaginary events with real memories (see Loftus, 2005 for a
review). The idea that people can be led to report imaginary
events has been established by research on the effects of leading
questions. Loftus and Palmer (1974) showed that participants
could be induced to remember seeing things that were not
presented in response to leading questions. One week after
having watched a video of a car accident, participants were
explicitly asked: “Did you see any broken glass?” The reported
false memories of broken glass could not have been derived
directly from the video, because the video did not actually show
any broken glass; thus, the false memory was arguably induced
by the question itself. Other researchers have demonstrated that
false verbal suggestions presented co-currently with events can
also induce false reports (Wiseman et al., 2003; Wiseman and
Greening, 2005; Wilson and French, 2014).
Similar results have been obtained in the absence of verbal
misinformation, such as when Gurney et al. (2013) demonstrated
that participants who were being questioned about a video
recording of a robbery could be induced to report false
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information in response to non-verbal “leading gestures.” For
example, when the interviewer stroked his chin, while asking
participants if they noticed any distinguishing features on the
robber in the video, participants were more likely to report falsely
that the robber had a beard compared to participants who were
asked the question without the accompanying gesture.
In both our PVI paradigm, and previous research with the
Vanishing Ball Illusion paradigm, the silent video clips that serve
as stimuli preclude the use of false verbal suggestions during
stimulus presentation. The Vanishing Ball Illusion paradigm
involves asking participants a series of questions relating to the
ball. After watching the video of the trick, the participants were
asked to mark the location of the last place they saw the ball
on a still picture that depicted the magician. Participants were
considered to be sensitive to the illusion if they indicated that
they had seen the ball leave the magician’s hand on the last
throw. They were considered insensitive to the illusion if they
(correctly) marked the magician’s hand as being the last place
where they had seen the ball. Participants were then asked to
describe what they saw, asked how the illusion was created, and
given a yes/no forced choice question: “Did you see the ball move
up on the final throw?” (Kuhn and Land, 2006). In contrast,
in our PVI paradigm, the participants freely reported seeing
the phantom object in response to a question that asked them
to recall “actions” and “events” but made no specific reference
to an object. In the PVI paradigm, given that there was no
object presented during the Phantom Vanish Trick video, care
was taken to ask participants non-leading questions, so as to
rule-out the potential for post-event information to generate
introspective errors during the participants’ recollection of the
events. The omission of a direct question about the object in the
PVI paradigm may partially account for the fact that 68% of our
420 participants did not report experiencing the PVI.
With regards to ecological versus inferential theories of
perception, our results do not support Gibson’s (1982) specific
ecological prediction that healthy sober people can never “see” a
non-existent object – 32% of the 420 participants who completed
our experiment reported that they had been shown objects
when none had been presented. These results support a more
inferential model of human perception. This concept, that
conscious phenomenological experience is actively constructed
by combining top-down cognitive processes with bottom-up
sensory information, may offer insight into how participants
came to experience the PVI.
Gregory’s (2009) framework for classifying illusory pheno-
menon includes both paradoxical illusions and fictional illusions.
Paradoxical illusions refer to perceptions that seem to be logically
impossible (e.g., Kulpa, 1987), while fictional illusions refer
to perceptual experiences that fail to directly correspond with
sensory information (e.g., modal and amodal completions).
Fictional illusions do not necessarily need to be based on false
assumptions. For example, the amodal completion of objects is
often based on accurate inferences: if one were to see a person
standing behind a picket fence, and this caused the image of the
person to be partially occluded, it would normally be correct to
assume that the person’s body really extends to areas occluded
by the fence, rather than them being neatly sliced into separate
sections.
We propose that sleight-of-hand illusions be classified as
“paradoxical fictions.” Magic tricks are designed to exploit
spectators’ inferences, along with their intuitions about their
own perceptual systems, to create the “illusion of impossibility”
(e.g., Nelms, 1969; Ortiz, 2006). Magic tricks are paradoxical in
that an effective magic trick will appear to violate the laws of
nature. For example, in a “vanishing” trick, an object appears to
pass from existence into non-existence. Magic tricks are fictional
in that the spectators’ perceptual experiences can often differ
dramatically from bottom-up sensory information, as in the case
with our PVI or with the Vanishing Ball Illusion. These magical
experiences can be considered “failures of visual metacognition”
(Beth and Ekroll, 2015, p. 520). That is to say, we tend to believe
what we see, and we are generally unaware of the discrepancy
between how our perceptual system actually works and how
we think it ought to work. Magic effects result from “hacking”
otherwise adaptive perceptual processes to create false fictional
experiences that lead to paradoxical experiences. In the case of
the PVI, people would generally not believe that they could “see”
an object where one does not exist. The “illusion of impossibility”
occurs when the magician reveals the conflict between reality
and the spectators’ perceptual experience. At the “climax” of the
Phantom Vanish Trick, the magician clearly shows that both of
his hands are empty. Because the spectator does not believe that
they could have misperceived an object that was never really
there, they are unable to intuit that the true method is even
possible.
One explanation for why participants reported phantom
objects during the Phantom Vanish Trick is that the participants’
top-down expectations about the object outweighed the bottom-
up sensory counter-evidence (the absence of the object; Kuhn
and Rensink, 2016). Various top-down expectations may have
contributed to the creation of an amodal spatiotemporal
representation of the object (Beth and Ekroll, 2015; Thomas
and Didierjean, 2016b). Among the 136 participants who were
categorized as having experienced the PVI, those who reported
a specific object (e.g., a coin) might have based their reports
on the perceptual experience of modal completion (they had
the impression that an object had been openly displayed),
while those who reported an object but did not specify which
object, might have based their reports on an amodal completion
(they had the impression that an object was presented, but
that it was occluded by the magician’s hand). However, one
limitation of our written response format for Question 1, in
which participants freely reported their experiences, is that we
cannot determine whether the participants who did not report
a specific object might have been capable of naming a specific
object, if asked. In any case, all participants who reported having
seen a phantom object apparently committed a metacognitive
error of failing to distinguish the representation from a real
object.
Participants’ top-down expectations may have been influenced
by multiple factors. Because there is no object presented
during the critical video, the PVI paradigm can potentially be
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used to isolate a variety of variables that may contribute to
sleight-of-hand illusions, including perceptual priming (i.e., the
expectations established by the preceding videos4), social cues
(i.e., the gaze and head direction of the magician), and the
convincingness of the magician’s pantomime (i.e., the grasp of
the non-existent object). In future studies, each of these factors
could be manipulated to isolate their respective roles in creating
the PVI. The preceding four videos in the five-video sequence did
include real objects. These videos may have served as perceptual
primes, analogous to the real tosses that precede the false throw in
the Vanishing Ball Illusion. One experiment (Kuhn and Rensink,
2016) has shown that manipulating the perceptual priming aspect
of a magic trick (the real tosses that precede the false throw
in the Vanishing Ball Illusion paradigm) affects the probability
that participants will experience the illusion, and that the illusion
can still be effective when the perceptual primes are eliminated
entirely from the trick (i.e., the magician simply showed the
ball and then immediately performed the false throw without
making any real tosses). This suggests that our PVI might still
be effective for some participants, even if the experiment were
modified to reduce or even eliminate the preceding videos. For
example, one could manipulate which objects are shown in
the preceding videos, or manipulate the number of videos that
precede the Phantom Vanish Trick. Additionally, the social cues
of the magician could be manipulated by occluding the magician’s
4 Of interest here is the fact that six participants in our experiment did not actually
report seeing a phantom object that was congruent with the object they had
been shown in previous videos. This might be attributable to the fact that the
magician depicted in the videos predominately practices and performs slight-of-
hand magic with coins, meaning that his pantomimed grasp shown during Video 5
(Phantom Vanish Trick) may have been most closely related to the grasp that
would be used to hold a coin. Alternatively, participants might have had a prior
expectation established outside of the experiment, that magic performances often
involve disappearing coins.
face, or by including a condition where the magician maintains a
fixed, unmoving gaze (see Thomas and Didierjean, 2016a).
In summary, the PVI represents a new contribution to the
rapidly growing field of the “Science of Magic” – the use of
methodologies inspired by performance magic to experimentally
investigate human psychology. Just as optical illusions and
visual arts represent a resource for visual scientists, the more
elaborate illusions created by magic performances can be used
to examine more complex elements of human visual cognition.
We hope that the PVI paradigm represents not only a novel
contribution to the Science of Magic, but more generally, a
new tool for perception researchers looking to untangle the
complex influences of top-down factors on the way people
process dynamic visual scenes.
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